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Abstract 
We analyze the effects of an incumbent's investment in backward compatibility of 
new products with old ones in the presence of network effects. Under consumers' 
utility function consisting of two components, "stand-alone valuation" and "network-
dependent valuation", we show that incumbent's investment level in backward 
compatibility always exceeds the social optimum because it raises consumers' 
switching costs in socially undesirable way. In addition to this, this divergence of 
incumbent's investment from a socially optimal one strongly depends on consumers' 
utility. Using a specified utility function, it is shown that this divergence could 
increase with the degree of complementarity between two components in utility 
function under some situations. 
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Recently, in many industries such as the computer industry and the household 
electrical appliances industry, formation and preservation of de facto standards have 
very important roles for business strategies. In these industries, products are often 
required to be supplied together with their compatible software, so that there can be 
strong network effects because of consumers' "mix and match" behavior (Matutes & 
Regibeau (1988» and/or increasing return to scale of software production (Chou & Shy 
(1990». Since Katz & Shapiro (1985) and Farrell & Saloner (1985), many authors have 
researched the implications of network effects on the competition for formation of de 
facto standards. Through their contributions, we have understood that a firm's 
supplying of a product that is compatible with a rival's products could constitute an 
important business strategy for formation of de facto standards. 
By contrast, firms that have already acquired de facto standards face the problem 
of how they can preserve their position. When a firm that has a large installed base 
decides to introduce new product, it has to determine the degree of compatibility of its 
new product with its old ones-backward compatibility. 1 However, in this decision, the 
firm faces the following trade-off: it could hurt its installed base by introducing a 
relatively incompatible product, while to maintain compatibility with old products, in 
general, it has to invest resources. 
Several authors have researched determination of backward compatibility in the 
presence of network effects. For example, Katz & Shapiro (1992) studied the date of 
introduction of new products in rigorous dynamic settings and showed that firms that 
have an installed base tend to introduce relatively incompatible new products. 
Whereas, Choi (1994) analyzed determination of backward compatibility levels in the 
case of a durable goods monopolist approach. He proved that a monopolist can attain 
profitable planned obsolescence through introducing incompatible new products. In 
this meaning, these two studies showed that incumbents would be inclined to choose a 
low degree of backward compatibility. 
It can be observed, however, that backward compatibility levels are different 
among various products. For example, in the Japanese video-game market, Nintendo, 
1 "Backward compatibility is defined as the ability of the new product to subscribe to 
the benefit of old product's network"(Choi (1994), p.173). Of course, there is also the 
concept of forward compatibility. For simplicity, we ignore this possibility. 
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which already has a large installed base through the success of "Family Computer," 
introduced new but almost perfectly incompatible machines, "Super Famicom" and 
"Nintendo 64." By contrast, in the Japanese personal computer market, it is well 
known that NEC, which also has a large installed base through the introduction of its 
"PC-98 series," has given relatively large backward compatibility to its new personal 
computer models. What factors account for this difference? 
In this paper, to explain this phenomenon and to examine its implications, we note 
the form of consumers' utility function. In fact, Katz & Shapiro and Choi assumed that 
the consumers' utility function would be represented by the sum of two components; 
"stand-alone valuation" and "network-dependent valuation." This assumption may be 
inadequate in considering the two markets cited in the previous paragraph, for 
consumers of the above two products may have extremely different preferences. 
Recently, Shy (1996) noted the relation between the two components in the consumers' 
utility function, and showed that this relation affects the duration of each product 
strongly. Although this research provides useful insight into the effects of backward 
compatibility, the author treated the compatibility level as exogenous. In order to focus 
upon the determination of backward compatibility levels, we consider the behavior of 
an incumbent who has an installed base and faces potential entrants. Through this 
consideration, we examine the implication of the incumbent's decision in favor of 
backward compatibility and the relation between the two components in the 
consumers' utility function. 
The main results of our analysis are as follows: (1) Under consumers' utility 
function consisting of two components, "stand-alone valuation" and "network-
dependent valuation," incumbent's investment level in backward compatibility always 
exceeds the social optimum. (2) Divergence of incumbent's investment from the 
socially optimal one strongly depends on consumers' utility. (3) This divergence could 
increase with the degree of complementarity between the two components in utility 
function under some situations. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the framework of our model. 
Using this framework, the effects and the welfare implications of an incumbent's 
decision with regard to investment in backward compatibility is illustrated in Section 
3. Section 4 examines how the complementarity between the two components in the 
consumers' utility function effects incumbent's decision. Section 5 concludes with a 
brief discussion of antitrust implications and further extensions. 
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2. The !\1odel 
To treat the above problems, consider the following model. There are N consumers, 
who have already purchased perfect durable goods with network effects and are 
considering buying improved versions. There are no new buyers arriving at the 
market. So, we consider only the repeat purchasing behavior of N consumers. The 
utility of each consumer is identical that of to each of the others and depends on the 
following two factors. The first, "stand-alone valuation" is the intrinsic value of the 
product to the consumer. Let Vo be the consumers' "stand-alone valuation" of the old 
product, and v, be this valuation of the improved version of the product supplied by 
firm i. The second factor is "network-dependent valuation" which shows the network 
effects of the product. In this model, it is assumed that consumers' demand is perfectly 
inelastic, and each consumer purchases at most one unit of the goods. Under this 
assumption, as network effects mean that the utility of the product is increased by the 
number of users of this product, we can write "network-dependent valuation" as this 
number N. So, the consumers' utility function can be represented by the function 
U (v j ,N) ; j=O or i. We assume that this function has the following natural property: 
U 1 > 0, U 2 > 0, U 11 ~ 0, U 22 ~ 0, where subscripts denote derivatives of the function 
by corresponding arguments. 
An incumbent (firm 1), which has already sold the old version of the goods to the 
consumers and has an installed base, develops a new superior version of the product 
without development costs.2 Facing a potential entrant (firm 2), it considers the 
backward compatibility level of the new product with its older ones. By investing x, 
it can attain the backward compatibility level e( x) . We assume that the function e( x) 
hasthe"well-behaved"property:3 e(O)=O, e(oo) = 1, e'(x»O, e"(x) <0 and e'(O) is 
sufficiently large.4 The backward compatibility makes the new product attractive for 
the consumers because of network effects. Assuming that consumers can coordinate 
2 As long as development costs are constant, the following conclusions are 
substantially unchanged. 
3 This property means that backward compatibility is imperfect. As pointed out in 
Chou & Shy (1993), many products, e.g., computer software, have only partial 
(backward) compatibility due to addition of functions to the new product. 
4 More rigorously, it is sufficient that e'(O) > 1/ N(U2 N + 8'(0» holds. 
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their purchasing decisions, consumer's (effective) "network-dependent valuation" of 
this new product becomes (1 + c( x» N .5 On the other hand, the potential entrant can 
also develop its new product with no development costs. Given the incumbent's 
behavior, the entrant can produce only a product that is perfectly incompatible with 
firm 1 products, because of, perhaps, the incumbent's patent. For simplicity, we 
assume that the marginal and average costs c of the new products are constant and 
the same for both incumbent and entrant. Moreover, it is assumed that Bertrand 
competition will occur in the new product market. 
In the market of the new product, consumers make purchasing decisions 
simultaneously. Under this environment, there could be multiple Nash equilibria for 
some prices. To avoid complex refinement problems, we assume consumers choose the 
Pareto-optimal outcomes.6 So, when consumers purchase the new product from the 
incumbent their utility is described by U(v J ,(1 + c(x»N) , while the utility becomes 
U(vo,N) if the consumers decide to stay with the old product of the incumbent. On 
the other hand, when they purchase the new product from the entrant, they enjoy 
utility U(V2 ,N). However, the incumbent's investment in backward compatibility not 
only affects "network-dependent valuation" of their own product, but also the 
attractiveness of their rival's product through the consumers' switching costs. That is, 
if consumers switch from the old product of the incumbent to the new product of the 
entrant, they are forced to bear the switching cost, s. 7 Due to accumulated "product-
specific" assets by consumers, when incumbent's new product has greater backward 
compatibility, consumers hesitate to switch to the incompatible product. Therefore, we 
assume that switching costs are described by a function that has the following 
property: s(O) = 0, s'(c(x» > 0, s"(c(x») < O. Furthermore, it is assumed that this 
function has an upper bound s = s(1) = U (v 2' N) - U (Vo ' N) - c. That is, switching 
costs cannot be so large as the increase in utility which the entrant can give to the 
consumers. This assumption enables us to exclude Uninterested outcomes in which 
5 In our setting, network effect is represented by the amount of installed base. By 
introducing new product, installed base is increased by the amount of c(x)N. 
6 If consumers make their purchasing decisions in a pre-determined order, the only 
subgame perfect equilibrium would be Pareto-optimal in the setting of complete 
information. See Farrell & Saloner (1985). 
7 For rigorous treatment of switching costs, for example, see Klemperer (1987) and 
Farrell & Shapiro (1988). 
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consumers continue to use the old product. In addition to this, because we are 
interested in the incumbent's entry-deterrence behavior, we concentrate on the 
situation where the incumbent wins the competition in the new product market. 
3. Incumbent's Behavior and its Welfare Implications 
Under this framework, we first consider the consumers' decision. Consumers 
purchase the new product from the incumbent if both the following conditions are 
satisfied: 
U(VI ,(1 + c(x»N) - PI ~ U(V2' N) - P2 - s(c(x» , (1) 
(2) 
where Pi denotes the price of firm i's new product. Condition (1) states that 
consumers enjoy larger utility if they purchase the product from the incumbent rather 
than from the entrant. Inequality (2) shows that utility from purchasing incumbent's 
new product exceeds reservation utility. 
The incumbent sets the price of its new product taking these conditions into 
account. Because Bertrand (price) competition prevails in the market, the maximum 
price offirm 1's new product, which deters entry, is as follows: 
PI = U(VI ,(1 + c(x»N) - U(V2 ,N) + s(c(x» + C . (3) 
Then, profit of incumbent, 1[1 is represented by 
1[1 = [U(VI ,(1 + c(x»N) - U(V2' N) + s(c(x»]N - x. (4) 
As we concentrate on the situation in which the incumbent wins the new product 
market, we assume that there are some x which will make equation (4) positive. In 
this situation, considering that the price of the entrant's new product is given by c, 
and that consumers' switching cost has the upper bound S , we can show that (1) 
implies (2). Therefore, the problem of firm 1 is merely maximizing its profit (4). This 
maximization leads firm 1 to choose the degree of backward compatibility of its 
product necessary to deter entry and to force consumers to purchase the new product. 
First-order condition of this maximization problem is described by 
[lhNc'(x) + s'(c(x»c'(x)]N = 1. (5) 
Under our framework, this maximization causes interior solution, x*. Added to this, 
second-order condition of this problem, d 2 1[J / dx 2 < 0, is also satisfied in our 
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framework. 8 Incumbent chooses its investment level-so, the degree of backward 
compatibility which will equate its marginal revenue to its marginal cost. Notice that 
its marginal revenue consists of two factors. The first, by increasing investment in 
backward compatibility, incumbent confers greater utility on the consumers through 
network effects. At the same time, increasing incumbent's investment also raises 
switching costs to consumers. This prevents the consumers' switching behavior to 
rival's product, and raises incumbent's profit. 
In order to examine the importance of the relation between "stand-alone valuation" 
and "network -dependent valuation" within the utility function, it is useful to perform 
comparative statics analysis. Differentiating first-order condition (5) totally, the effect 
of the change of "stand-alone valuation" on optimal investment to backward 
compatibility is represented by the following equation: 
dx* U21N 2 c'(x) 
= d 2 J[ / dx2 • 
I 
(6) 
(6) shows that the effect of the change of "stand-alone valuation" strongly depends 
upon the relation between two components in the utility function. In fact, we have the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 1: Under the complementary (substitutional) relation between "stand-
alone valuation" and "network-dependent valuation" in utility function-that is, 
U2) > «)0, increases in VI raise (reduce) incumbents optimal investment in backward 
compatibility-th us, the degree of backward compatibility. 
Remark: Notice that incumbent's optimal investment level IS not influenced by 
increases in "stand-alone valuation," when the two components in the utility function 
are separable from each other-for example, if consumers' utility function has the 
form, U = v) + u(l + c(x)N). For, in this case, the change of "stand-alone valuation" 
does not affect marginal utility of "network-dependent valuation." 
We can interpret consumers' "stand-alone valuation" as the quality of incumbent's 
new product. If the two components in the utility function have a complementary 
8 Second order condition is [U22 (NC')2 + U2Nc" + S"(C,)2 + s'c"]N < 0 in abbreviated 
form. 
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(substitutional) relation, consumers place more (less) value on network effects of this 
new product when innovation embodied in the product becomes drastic. As a result, 
incumbent can enjoy more profit by increasing (decreasing) the degree of backward 
compatibility. In this meaning, the above proposition suggests to us the importance of 
the form of the utility function in examining the backward compatibility level. 
Now, let us turn to the problem of welfare maximization. Consider a social planner 
who knows that consumers will choose a Pareto-optimal outcome. This planner could 
choose the backward compatibility level of incumbent's new product through 
determination of de juri standards. In our model, consumers have three options: to 
purchase a new product from the incumbent, to purchase from the entrant or to stay 
with the old product of the incumbent. In this situation, considering that consumers 
have perfectly inelastic demand, to maximize social welfare, the social planner merely 
examines the following equation: 
i1W = max.[m~x.{[u(vl'(1 + c(x»N) - U(vo,N) - c]N - x}, 
m~x.{[U(V2' N) - U(vo ,N) - s(c(x» - c]N - x},o] , (7) 
where i1W denotes the increase in social welfare. Needless to say, each argument in 
the right-hand side of (7) shows a maximum increase in the welfare society enjoys 
when consumers choose the above three options; to purchase a new product from the 
incumbent, from the entrant or to stay with old product, respectively. 
Considering that incumbent's profit (4) is assumed to be non-negative, and that 
consumers' switching costs have upper bound S, we can show that the first argument 
in the right-hand side of (7) is greater than the third argument. On the other hand, 
the second argument is decreasing with x. So, this argument attains the maximum 
value at x = 0 . That is, we can transform (7) as follows: 
i1W = max. [ m~x.{[U(Vl,(1 + c(x»N) - U(vo, N) - c]N - x}, 
[U(v2 ,N) - U(vo,N) - c]N]. (8) 
When the second argument in the right-hand side of (8) is greater than the first 
argument, that is, when there is no x satisfied U(VI ,(1 + c(x»N)N - x ~ U(v2,N)N, 
the socially optimal investment level is O. In this case, the market solution obviously 
exceeds the socially optimal amount. Conversely, when there are some x satisfied 
U(vl,(l +c(x»N)N -x ~ U(v2,N)N, it is socially optimal that the amount of the first 
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argument in the right-hand side of (8) be maximized. Differentiating this argument 
with x, we can obtain the first-order condition of welfare maximization in this case.9 
That is, 
(9) 
Let us evaluate the first-order condition of incumbent's profit maximization problem at 
the socially optimal investment level X S which satisfies (9). Then, from (5) and (9), it 
holds that 
dml s = [hN2c'(xS) + s'(c(xS»c'(xS)N -1 > dl1WI s = O. 
dx x dx x 
(10) 
From the above discussion, we can derive the following proposition. 
Proposition 2: Incumbent's investment level to backward compatibility exceeds the 
socially optimal amount, that is x· > X S • Therefore, the market tends to cause socially 
excessive backward compatibility. 
Notice that we can rewrite the condition of a positive incumbent's profit as 
U(v] ,(1 + (c(x))N)N - x> [U(V2' N) - s(c(x))]N. Therefore, there exists some 
situations which satisfy U(v2,N)N>U(v],(I+c(x)N)N-x,Vx, and make 
incumbent's profit positive. This consideration leads us to the next proposition. 
Proposition 3: There are some situations in which consumers choose the incumbent's 
new product due to the incumbent's investment in backward compatibility, though it 
is socially optimal that consumers switch to rival's new product. 
Economic interpretation of these propositions is very simple. As mentioned above, 
incumbent can raise its profit by increasing its investment level in backward 
compatibility through two routes. (1) By network effect based on the previously sold 
old product, incumbent provides greater utility to the consumers. (2) By raising 
switching costs of the consumers, incumbent can "lock -in" consumers to its own 
products and prevent consumers' switching to the rival's product. Socially, effect (2) is 
undesirable. So, incumbent invests excessively in backward compatibility. More 
importantly, the benefit the potential entrant can provide is reduced by these 
9 Second order condition is also satisfied, that is, U 22 N\c'(X»2 + U2Nc"(x) < o. 
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switching costs. By increasing the degree of backward compatibility, the incumbent 
can raise its rival's cost indirectly. This increase in the rival's cost makes the 
incumbent's entry-deterrence behavior easy and effective. However, this entry-
deterrence behavior is never socially desirable . 
. 4. Substitutability vs. Complementarity between Two Components in 
Utility Function: An Example 
When we consider backward compatibility of new goods, our discussion in the 
previous section suggests the importance of substitutability (complementarity) 
between two components in utility function: "stand-alone valuation" and "network-
dependent valuation." To make the argument clearly, in this section we specify utility 
function as a quadratic form.lO This quadratic form of utility function can be 
represented by 
1 ( 2 2) U(vj,n) = a l VI + a 2 n - 2" fJIVj + 2}'Vjn + fJ2 n ,j = O,l,2;n = N,(l + c(x»N , (11) 
where a l ,a2 ,fJI ,fJ2 > O,fJlfJ2 > r2. Under this specification, substitutability between 
two components is described by the sign of r. That is, positive (negative) sign of r 
means that the two components are substitute (complement). 
Using this utility function, we can write incumbent's profit (4) as follows: 
ITI = {al VI + a 2 (1 + c(x»N - ±(fJI v; + 2}'VI (1 + c(x»N + fJ2 [0 + C(X»NY)}N 
- {al v2 + a 2N - ~ (fJI v~ + 2}'V2N + fJ2N 2) - S(C(X»}N - x. (12) 
In the same way as the previous section, let us concentrate on the situation in which 
(12) is non-negative. Then, it follows that the first-order condition of incumbent's profit 
maximization yields 
{N[a2 -}'VI - fJ2(1 + c(x»N] + SI(C(X»}cl(x)N = 1. (13) 
Moreover, second-order condition, which is satisfied under our assumptions, can be 
written by 




-Z_I =c"(x)N{N(az -('VI -fJz(1+c(x»N)+s'(c(x»} dx 
- c'(x)N{ N Z fJzc'(x) - s"(c(x»c'(x)} < O. (14) 
By usmg a procedure similar to that in the previous section, we can perform 
comparative statics analysis. Especially, the effect of r on x * is interesting for our 
purpose. Then, 
dx' = vlc'(x)Nz < 0 
dr d Z Jrl I dx 2 • 
(15) 
Therefore, we can obtain proposition 4, which is a variant of proposition 1, under our 
specification of utility function. 
Proposition 4: Increase in complementarity between "stand-alone valuation" and 
"network-dependent valuation" leads the incumbent to raise investment level in 
backward compatibility of the new product. 
To compare incumbent's optimal investment with the social optimum, we are 
required to describe the social welfare function. Under our specification, we can write 
(8) as follows: 
(16) 
where 
F(x) = {al(v1 -vo)+a2 c(x)N}N 
- ~[j31 (v~ - v~) + 2('Vlc(x)N + 2yN(vl - vo) + fJz {[(1 + c(X»N]2 - N 2} - C]N - x 
G={al(V2 -VO)-~[fJl(V; -v~)+2yN(V2 -Vo)]-C}N. 
The conditions11 by which social welfare is maximized can be written by 
11 When the first argument in the right-hand side of (17) is greater than the second 
argument, we are required to check the second-order condition of social welfare 
maximization. Under our framework, this condition is also satisfied; that is, 
dZ/iW 
dx 2 = c"(x)N2 [az - ('VI - fJ2 (l + c(x»N] - fJ2C'(X)2 N 3 < O. 
11 
if max.F(x) 2 G 
x 
X S = 0, otherwise. (17) 
Comparing (13) with (17), we can easily check the validity of proposition 2 and 3. 
Recall that under the situation in which proposition 3 holds, society can maximize 
social welfare by introducing a new rival product that is perfectly incompatible. On the 
other hand, we know that the incumbent's optimal investment is increasing with the 
degree of complementarity from (15). So, we can derive the following proposition. 12 
Proposition 5: Consider the situation in which proposition 3 holds. In this case, 
increase in the degree of complementarity between "stand-alone valuation" and 
"network-dependent valuation" enlarges divergence of market solution from social 
optimum. 
Economic interpretation of this proposition is also simple. Increase in the degree of 
complementarity between "stand-alone valuation" and "network-dependent valuation" 
means that the two components are positively related. Under this situation, the 
incumbent invests more and more in compatibility, because by doing so it can enjoy a 
larger profit through raising the price of the new product. Whereas, this raises the 
consumers' switching cost and easily enables the incumbent to deter entry. However, 
this latter effect is socially undesirable. Therefore, an increase in the degree of 
complementarity between two components in utility function enlarges the disparity 
between market solution and social optimum. 
This proposition suggested to us the importance of the degree of complementarity 
between two components in utility function. Shy (1996) interpreted this 
complementarity (substitutability) as the rigidity (flexibility) of consumers' use of the 
product from being centralized to decentralized while maintaining the same "stand-
alone valuation."13 Let us apply this interpretation to the "systems market" and 
consider the implications of the proposition. 
12 Even if we consider the situation in which proposition 3 does not hold, under tedious 
condition there exists the environment in which the next proposition holds. 
13 See Shy (1996), p.787. 
12 
In the "systems market," hardware must often match with compatible software. 
Under this hardware/software paradigm, it is well known that the preference on 
hardware has a large network effect because of, e.g., the availability of its software 
and/or increasing returns to scale of the production of software. On this setting, the 
above rigidity (flexibility) could strongly depend on the continuity of the value of 
software over time. Consider, for example, video-game products. In general, video-
game software has only short continuity of value, because users of video-game 
software experience a large reduction of economic value when they finish the video-
game. This tendency permits consumers to have flexibility of their use from any 
specific game to other games. Consumers' preference on the video-game machine also 
has this flexibility. Therefore, on this kind of product, relation between "stand-alone 
valuation" and "network-dependent valuation" is relatively substitute. In this case, the 
degree of backward compatibility is relatively small. In addition to this, under the 
situation in which proposition 5 holds, disparity between market solution and social 
optimum tends to be small. 
On the contrary, consumers' preference for hardware whose software has long 
continuity of value tends to "rigidity." Consider, for example, personal computers. 
Users of a personal computer have many useful files which were made on a specific 
hardware/software combination. These files are often useful for doing their work, so 
continue to keep their economic value. Under this environment, users of a personal 
computer hesitate to change their use of a computer from this specific computer to 
other ones. Therefore, their preference for a personal computer is "rigidity," so the 
relation between "stand-alone valuation" and "network-dependent valuation" becomes 
relatively complementary. There is a relatively high degree of backward compatibility 
around this type of product. Moreover, disparity between market solution and social 
optimum may be serious. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
We have discussed the implications of incumbent's investment in backward 
compatibility using a very simple model. Our analyses have shown that an 
incumbent's investment level in backward compatibility always exceeds the socially 
optimal one. This conclusion is derived from the fact that an incumbent's commitment 
to backward compatibility raises socially undesirable switching costs. The relation 
13 
between "stand-alone valuation" and "network-dependent valuation" in utility function 
may affect the above divergence. The degree of complementarity between two 
components would tend to enlarge this disparity, because incumbent's commitment to 
backward compatibility hurts social welfare in some situations. 
In the hardware/software paradigm, we can interpret this complementarity as 
being derived from continuity of the value of the software based on particular 
hardware. This interpretation may have an antitrust implication. As pointed out in 
the above section, divergence of market solution to social optimum may be serious 
where the software based on the hardware has a long continuity of its economic value. 
Therefore, in considering antitrust policy on a hardware product, we should pay 
attention to continuity of the economic value of its software. 
We confine ourselves to the very simple model in order to explain incumbent's 
behavior with regard to backward compatibility clearly. Further research is required 
in the situation in which new buyers arrive at the new product market. As pointed out 
in Waldman (1993) and Choi (1994), facing different types of consumers incumbent 
has various pricing strategies in this setting. So, introducing this factor into our model 
makes the analysis very difficult. In addition to this, taking the above mechanism, 
which affects backward compatibility, into account, incumbent may commit to sell its 
old product to the consumers at the first stage. These problems are very interesting for 
understanding the determination of backward compatibility level in the presence of 
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